Something that I've been wondering for some time now is how Lacan might find his way into Levinasian theory. And the diagram that was drawn on the board during class on Monday got me thinking: is it possible that when Levinas envisions his servile obligations to the Other that we encounter the Lacanian conception of the Lack?
The way that I understood it was that, as it stands, we hold an innate, infinite obligation to the Other. We can't escape this obligation, so that the Other continually demands the same level of respect and consideration today tomorrow and forever. Consequently, we are perpetually subordinate to the Other and can never be equal, let alone masters, over the Other. Here is where I think that the Lack would enter the scene. In terms of the power relationship between myself and the Other, I do not hold the reins. I will always desire what the Other has in terms of myself, ie control over my ethical freedom. Consequently, whenever I engage with the Other, I make a mad dash for the throne of power over my own ethical free will. But, according to Levinas (as I understand it), we can never really achieve that ethical free will. We complete the ethical action, wanting to control ourselves, but in the end the Other retains control; we will perpetually lack that control, and consequently will perpetually desire the control because we lack it.
Am I making a radical misinterpretation/bastardization of either theory here? This is making sense in my head, but perhaps it's not translating to the keyboard.
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